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Abstract—EMV is the contactless payment protocol 
supported worldwide by the major credit card companies in 
countries outside the USA.  This paper presents a hybrid 
formal/non-formaldesign and implementation process forhigh 
integrity protocol emulators as well as a corresponding 
implementation of the EMV protocol and point of sale 
terminal.  The objective of the EMV emulator is to test new 
cards and applications and to experiment with protocol attack 
and failure scenarios.  The proposed design and 
implementation processincludes a systemic inspection of the 
EMV natural language specification, the generation of a 
formal abstract model that represents the EMV protocol, the 
generation of test cases from the formal abstract model, 
continuous feedback from the implementation and the systemic 
documentation of the emulator code.We have applied the 
design and implementation process to the development of 
emulator code for Chip & PIN transactions, Visa contactless 
transactions and MasterCard contactless transactions. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The EMV specifications (EMV stands for Europay, 
MasterCard and Visa) control the operation of one and a half 
billion payment cards and twenty-one million point of sale 
terminals worldwide [6].  EMV payments can be contact 
mode (commonly termed Chip & PIN) and contactless 
mode, also known as NFC (Near Field Communication).  
Contact payments require the cardholder to insert the card 
into the point of sale terminal and enter their PIN to confirm 
the transaction.  These Chip & PIN transactions can be any 
value up to the card limit / available balance on the card.  
Contactless payments are designed to be a convenient way to 
pay for low value (of the order of twenty euro, pounds or 
dollars, depending on the national arrangements) transactions 
with a card rather than cash.  Designed to be faster than a 
traditional Chip & PIN transaction, the card is placed in 
close proximity to the point of sale terminal to authorise 
transactions.  A PIN is only required once every so many 
purchases, depending on the specific implementation of the 
protocol. 
The EMV protocol is thus the mainstay of card based 
payment, including contact and contactless, and, 
increasingly, payment through phones [7].  An emulator 
allows one to test cards or applications that use the EMV 
protocol, and  to try out attacks against EMV‘s security and 
dependability provisions.  Especially in the latter case, the 
correctness of the emulator‘s protocol implementation is 
critically important.  In this paper we introduce a 
practicalhybrid process for the design and implementation of 
protocol emulators, using a combination of formal 
techniques and careful implementation processes to gain and 
increase confidence in the correctness of the emulator 
implementation. In addition, we illustrate the use of this 
process to the development of an EMV point of sale 
terminal. 
Our design and implementation approach combines 
informal and formal techniques.  At the centre of our 
approach are UML sequence diagrams, which we use as the 
informal but precise description of the protocol fragments.  It 
takes three main sources as input: (i) the EMV documents, 
(ii) feedback from the insights gained by the developers from 
coding the emulator, and (iii) feedback from the insights 
gained by the designers from constructing a formal model.  
To maintain control over the implementation, we rely on 
systemic code documentation and cross-referencing between 
code, UML diagrams and EMV specification, as we will 
explain.   
The formal aspects of our approach are inspired on Praxis 
methodology [3], tailored to our needs. It focuses on the 
construction and proof of an abstract model using the Z 
notation [19].  This abstract model is used to investigate the 
consistency of the requirements, expose descriptive errors, 
and ultimately be used to generate test cases for the emulator 
code.  Ultimately, if our abstract formal model correctly 
characterises the EMV requirements, then our test cases will 
be both minimal and wide-reaching, given they come from 
the mathematical characterisation of the EMV requirements 
for NFC.   
The informal techniques are the main building blocks for 
the implementation, but, importantly, feedback from the 
formal modelling as well as the coding is included in the 
systemic process to build the emulator.  The end result is a 
software emulator for the EMV transaction protocol 
sequence, and a demonstration that for generated test cases 
the emulator is an accurate representation of EMV.   
The resulting emulator is the only emulator we know of 
that implements the Point of Sale terminal side of the EMV 
contactless protocol.  Other emulators, such as [12][10], 
focus on the card device behaviour or are limited to the Chip 
& PIN contact protocol sequence.  It should be noted that 
once the code is complete it will be made available as an 
open source emulator (the current code has significant 
functionality, including the contact and VISA contactless 
sequences, with three others (MasterCard, Amex and JCB) 
still remaining). 
This paper is organised as follows.  We first explain the 
design process we followed in Section II.  The soundness of 
the process is critical to gain confidence in the correctness of 
the emulator with respect to it implementing the EMV 
protocol correctly.  Section III discusses the emulator design 
and implementation.  Section IV introduces the formal model 
in some detail—it is not within the scope of this paper to 
discuss all details of the formal model.  The role of the 
formal model in this paper is to generate test cases Section 
IV.C for the implementation and to feed insights back to the 
construction of the UML sequence diagrams. In Section VI 
the generated test cases and results of the tests are discussed.  
We conclude the paper with an evaluation of the quality of 
the code as well as the design process in Section VII, a 
discussion of related work in Section VIII and a conclusion 
in Section IX. 
II. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
Ensuring that the emulation is an accurate representation 
of the EMV specification requires a systematic approach, 
which is documented at all stages, and which takes feedback 
from each stage of the process to refine the design and 
implementation of the emulator.The EMV requirement 
specifications [1][2] consist of over 2,000 pages of written 
English and flow diagrams. There are five distinct 
transaction sequences described in the EMV specifications: 
the original Chip & PIN contact transaction and four 
contactless transactions (one each for Visa, MasterCard, 
American Express and JCB), the latter four all being relevant 
for our work. Each transaction sequence is described in 
multiple sections spread across multiple volumes of the 
EMV requirements.  For example Book 2 of the Chip & PIN 
specification [1] contains all of the security and cryptography 
functionality required for all of the contact and contactless 
transaction sequences described in the other books. 
The process we follow in the implementation of the 
emulator is detailed in the UML activity diagram of Fig. 
1The rounded boxes are activity nodes within the process, 
with reference numbers such as [A1].  The square boxes are 
object nodes with references such as [O1.0]: these are the 
data sources that drive the activities.  Connecting edges, 
represented as black solid-arrows, indicate the default order 
in the flow of activities.  However, the process is iterative, 
and the red dashed-arrows are connecting edges which 
indicate feedback within the process.   
At the centre of our approach is the construction [A1] of 
UML sequence diagrams [O1.1].  Much of the process is 
about constructing these sequence diagrams as accurate as 
possible. To achieve this, we use a detailed analysis of the 
EMV requirements and a detailed working knowledge of the 
structure of the various specifications contributing to a single 
transaction. Moreover, we use feedback from the formal 
model construction [A2], the derivation of test cases [A3] 
and the coding [A4].   
The EMV specifications [O0.0] are the originating source 
of all of the data in the process.  Any data or assumption 
made in the emulator code or in the abstract model should be 
traceable back to its origin (i.e.  the book/section/page within 
the EMV specifications).  The EMV specifications are 
structured so that the complete description for a single 
transaction sequence is split across multiple sections and 
multiple books.  The UML sequence diagrams [O1.1] are 
collate these multiple sources into a single easy to follow 
description of the transaction sequence.  The transaction 
sequence diagrams [O1.1] are the initial stage of the iterative 
process that we used to create the concrete software 
implementation of the emulator [O4.1].   
Fig. 1. Process of Creating and Validating an EMV Emulator 
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The UML sequence diagrams capture the sequence and 
logic of the transaction protocol, see Fig. 2 for an example.  
The implementation detail required to write the emulator 
code is captured using descriptive text and detailed 
references to the EMV specification, see TABLE I.  for an 
example of the cross-referencing.  During coding this list of 
references is used to retrieve the implementation details 
required to create the code.  The references are also included 
in the code so that the link between the code and the EMV 
specification is documented.   
The UML diagrams with the associated list of EMV 
references are used to guide the coding process [A4].  The 
diagrams guide the structure of the code whilst the detail of 
the coding is taken from the referenced book / section / page 
in the EMV specifications. 
At each stage of the process if additional information is 
found about the working of EMV it is fed back into the UML 
transaction sequence diagrams [O1.1].  The feedback is 
essential to refine our understanding of the EMV 
specifications and document it.  Each time the diagrams are 
updated this drives the improvement of the emulator code 
[O4.1].  The completed Emulator Code is used in practical 
experiments [A5], running full or partial transaction 
sequences against bank cards. 
Given the sheer scale of the EMV specification and its 
internal inconsistencies, we found it paramount to have a 
systematic, more rigorous, description of EMV specification 
details.  These formal developments are depicted on the left 
hand side of Fig. 2.  This results in an Abstract Model 
[O2.1], which has two important functions.  First, we use it 
to develop test cases [O3.1].  Secondly, through the 
construction of the abstract model and test cases we create a 
deeper understanding of the EMV specification.  This results 
in important feedback in establishing the correct transition 
diagrams in [A1].   
The Test Cases [O3.1] can be used in two types of test.  
First, it helps provide confidence that the emulator is an 
accurate representation of the EMV specifications.  
Secondly, based on proof approaches detailed in Section IV, 
we can show that bank cards behave in an anomalous 
manner as identified in the List of Anomalies [O2.2].  To 
show that the emulator is an accurate representation of the 
EMV specification, we create the transaction data and 
terminal capabilities, which according to the abstract model 
[O2.1], should result in a particular outcome.  Test [A5] can 
then be run against bank cards to investigate whether the 
cards under test implement the anomalous functionality we 
have identified in [O2.2].  Even though it may concern 
anomalous functionality, correct results of the tests [O5.1] 
provide the basis of our assertion that the emulator is an 
accurate representation of the EMV specification. 
III. EMULATOR 
In this section we review the main implications the 
design process had on the design and implementation of the 
EMV emulator.  In particular, we discuss in Section III.A the 
UML sequence diagrams and explain how we documented 
the diagrams and the code with cross references to the EMV 
specifications.  We also discuss in Section III.B the data 
dependencies within the code.  
At a high level, the emulator code follows the Model 
View Controller design pattern.  This has the advantage of 
allowing us to encapsulate the EMV transaction sequence 
logic as it is specified in [1][2] and keeping it separate from 
the user interface code and the contactless card reader device 
driver. 
The code follows the structure of the EMV specifications 
with a kernel for Chip & PIN transactions and 4 contactless 
kernels for Visa, MasterCard, American Express and JCB.  
The contactless kernels are controlled by the Entry Point 
which decides which kernel to run based on the card 
presented to the reader, this exactly follows the structure of 
the EMV contactless specification [2].   
A. Documenting EMV Transaction Sequences 
The UML sequence diagram in Fig. 2collates information 
from multiple sections of the EMV specification to capture a 
transaction protocol sequence (in this case Visa fDDA 
transaction for offline transactions) in a single diagram.  It 
shows the communication between a terminal and a card, 
with the messages that go back and forth.  In this example, 
the card and terminal first determine the type of payment it 
will execute, defined through the Application identifier 
(AID).  It then creates specific request in its Processing 
Options Data Object List (PDOL).  The terminal then loops 
through several read request as indicated by the Application 
File Locator (AFL). 
Fig. 2. fDDA Contactless Offline Transaction 
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TABLE I. contains a description of each operation in the 
UML sequence diagram and associated references to the 
original EMV specification. This gives the level of detail 
required to keep control over the implementation of the 
emulator code. 
Level of detail in the table means that providing the 
details of the entire transaction sequence would cover several 
pages.We have therefore restricted it to the entries for the 
GetProcessingOptions() command (see Fig. 2) and the card‘s 
responsesforthat command. 
In TABLE I. the blue cells contain a description of a 
terminal command, the yellow describe the responses from 
the card and the white cells contain the references to the 
EMV specification where the details of the preceding cell 
can be found. 
TABLE I.  REFERENCES FOR UML DIAGRAM FIG. 2 
GetProcessingOptions(PDOL data) 
In the Visa fDDA transaction Get Processing Options (GPO) is used to 
request completion of the transaction.  The PDOL data must contain all of 
the data elements requested by the card otherwise the transaction will be 
rejected. 
EMV v2.2 Book C-3 - 2.4.1 Initiate Application Processing  p12 
EMV v2.2 Book C-3 - 5.2 Initiate Application Processing  p40 
EMV v2.2 Book C-3 - 5.2.1 Get Processing Options (GPO) Command  p40 
EMV v2.2 Book C-3 - 5.2.2 Initiate Application Processing  p40 – 46 
EMV v4.3 Book 3 - 6.5.8.4 Data Field Returned in the Response  p60 
Transaction Approved – TC + SDAD + AC + AFL 
If the card approves the completion of the transaction in offline mode, it 
will return Transaction Cryptogram  (TC) in the Cryptogram Information 
Data (CID).  The card also returns all of the data elements required by the 
terminal to complete the transaction: 
Signed Dynamic Application Data (SDAD) used by the terminal to verify 
that the card has approved the same transaction that the terminal sent. 
Application Cryptogram (AC) used in the completion of the transaction 
with the Bank to validate that a valid card completed the transaction. 
Application File Locator (AFL) contains the location in the card‘s file 
structure where the terminal can read the data elements required to 
complete the transaction. 
EMV v2.2 Book C-3 - 5.4.3 Determine the Card Disposition  p50 
EMV v2.2 Book C-3 - 5.2.2.2 GPO Response SW1 SW2  p43 
EMV v2.2 Book C-3 - 5.2.2.3 Contactless Path Determination  p46 
EMV v2.2 Book C-3 - A.2 Data Elements by Name  p97 
EMVv2.2  Book C-3  Annex C Fast Dynamic Data Authentication  p127 
EMV v2.2 Book C-3 - C.1 Dynamic Signature Verification  p128 
EMV v4.3 Book 3 - 6.5.8 Get Processing Options APDUs  p59 
EMV v4.3 Book 3 - 6.5.8.4 Data Field Returned in the Response  p60 
Transaction Must Go Online –ARQC 
If the card requires online completion of the transaction it will return 
ARQC in the Cryptogram Information Data (CID).  Online completion is 
required when the amount of the transaction exceeds the cards offline 
transaction limit or offline cumulative limit or when the number of offline 
transactions exceeds the number of consecutive offline transactions. 
EMV v2.2 Book C-3 - 5.4.3 Determine the Card Disposition  p50 
EMV v2.2 Book C-3 - A.2 Data Elements by Name  p97 
EMV v2.2 Book C-3 - 2.4.7 Online Processing (EMV Mode) p14 
EMV v2.2 Book C-3 - 2.4.8 Completion (EMV Mode)  p15 
Transaction Declined - AAC 
If the card declines the transaction it returns AAC in the CID.  The card 
declines the transaction when it cannot be completed as requested by the 
terminal.   
EMV v2.2 Book C-3 - 5.4.3 Determine the Card Disposition  p50 
EMV v2.2 Book C-3 - A.2 Data Elements by Name  p97 
EMV v2.2 Book C-3 - 2.4.7 Online Processing (EMV Mode) p14 
EMV v2.2 Book C-3 - 2.4.8 Completion (EMV Mode)  p15 
Command Error 
The possible error codes returned by Get Processing Options are: 
6984- Try Another Interface.  The transaction should be reattempted using 
either the contact interface or the magnetic strip interface.   
6985 - Select Next.  The transaction should be reattempted using the next 
combination of Kernel / AID (if any). 
6986 - Try Again, reattempt the transaction with the same parameters.  The 
card must be represented, this may occur if the card is removed too early. 
EMV v2.2 Book C-3 - 5.2.2.2 GPO Response SW1 SW2  p43 
EMV v2.2 Book C-3 - 2.4.8 Completion (EMV Mode)  p15 
EMV v2.2 Book B - 3.3 Combination Selection  p24 
B. Documenting the Data Dependencies 
The EMV specifications contain a number of complex 
data structures that control the operation of the transaction 
sequence.  We have therefore documented the data 
dependencies of the transaction sequences as it is important 
to understand what the critical data elements are when 
coding the emulator.  An example can be seen in Fig. 3The 
same object and activity symbols have been used as in Fig. 
2with the additional decision elements e.g. [D1] to specify 
the detail of the decision nodes. 
Fig. 3. Data Dependencies of the fDDA Transaction 
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The outcome of the transaction is dependent on the 
settings / status of the terminal [O1.0], the value of the 
transaction [O1.1] and the settings / status of the card [O2.0]. 
As an example, the significant terminal settings [O1.0] 
are the Terminal floor limits which specify the maximum 
value for offline transactions.  The Terminal Transaction 
Qualifiers (TTQ) which define modes in which the terminal 
can operate (online / offline), the reader interfaces supported 
(EMV / magnetic strip), the cardholder verification modes 
supported (PIN / Signature / No Verification) and the card 
authentication cryptographic methods supported (SDA / 
DDA / CDA). 
The significant transactions are the transaction amount 
and the transaction date.  The amount can be greater than the 
terminal floor limits for this transaction or cumulatively over 
a number of transactions performed on the terminal.  The 
amount can also be greater than the card limits for this 
transaction or cumulatively over a number of transactions 
performed by the card.  The date of the transaction is 
checked against the start and expiry dates of the card. 
The significant card settings [O2.0] are the start / expiry 
dates, value limit for offline transactions, cumulative value 
limit for offline transactions, limit for the number of 
consecutive offline transactions, authentication methods 
supported (SDA / DDA / CDA), operational modes (online / 
offline), supported reader interfaces (EMV / magnetic strip), 
cardholder verification modes (PIN / Signature / No 
Verification). 
IV. FORMAL ABSTRACT MODEL 
In this work, we studied the EMV requirements 
documents [1][2] to produce a formal abstract model of its 
properties and functionalities, specifically for the 
fDDAcontactless transaction protocol (summarised in Fig. 
2The motivation is to mathematically capture these 
requirements enabling checking properties of interest to hold 
(i.e.the requirements documents are consistent), and to 
produce test cases for our EMV emulator derived from 
formal proof.  We first elaborate in Section A on the use of 
formal methods in the design of high-integrity software, and 
then discuss in Section B the specific use of the abstract 
model for the implementation of the emulator. 
A. Formal Models in High-Integrity Software 
The motivation for our approach comes from the 
development of embedded systems in the safety-critical 
domain, where both UML diagrams and formal models are 
used.  Benefits include the creation of meaningful 
abstractions without implementation details, and early 
discovery of faults.  There is a distinction between rigorous 
hand-written mathematics and formal mechanically checked 
mathematics descriptions.  High assurance is achievable via 
correctness-by-construction and a rigorous evaluation of 
risks and costs [3]. 
A mathematical characterisation of requirements is 
created as an abstract model.  A proof that the security or 
other properties is established by the model serves as 
evidence that properties are ensured by the abstract model, 
and similarly for the concrete design and code.  Concrete 
designs are created rigorously or formally, with or without 
refinement proofs linking layers of development, depending 
on the desired assurance level.  From the concrete formal 
design, a minimal set of code test cases with high coverage is 
generated.   
In the highest-assurance scenarios, functional correctness 
proofs of code are performed to check if code behaviour 
corresponds to specifications.  Available code-generators can 
take the formal design and produce provably correct code.  
System design represents the (mathematically) documented 
application programming interfaces (APIs).  A landmark 
example is by the US National Security Agency on access 
control [3] it introduces a new software standard with efforts 
quantitatively measured and justified.  In our case, we 
created a formal model of the EMV NFC requirements as 
way of validating the current implementation and of 
introducing a model-based testing methodology to the study 
of EMV emulator code.  That is, if our formal model 
properly captures the requirements, we can instantiate its 
variables with specific values to create test cases that will 
exercise all classes of tests/problems possible within the 
EMV spectrum.  The idea is to have a minimal set of tests 
that captures all classes of tests possible.   
In [20], we provide an abstract model of the complete 
operation of the EMV fDDAcontactless transaction, with 
proof ensuring all the conditions to establish the feasibility of 
operations involved in the sequence diagram of Fig. 2These 
proofs are then used to produce the test cases [Fig. 1O3.1] 
for the EMV emulator.In this way, we ensure that the 
emulator code does indeed satisfy the conditions 
underpinned by the model.  The test cases are described in 
this Section C. 
Ultimately, this model is to be used to either derive code, 
or to be used as code annotation to be used by static analysis 
tools to determine its correctness with respect to both EMV 
specification and formal model, and ultimately the EMV 
requirements documents themselves.  Code contracts [5] are 
used to detect run-time errors like division by zero.  
Functional correctness requires contracts often twice the 
code size.  Properties analysed depend on the contract 
provided and on the levels of assurance or correctness 
needed.  Contract provenance is thus an important aspect of 
the code verification process.   
B. Abstract Model 
Our abstract model uses the Z notation.  Proof 
obligations in Z are usually of three kinds: well-formedness 
of models, where partial functions are applied within their 
domains, and unique existential quantifiers are sound; 
operational feasibility, where specified operations have 
(implicitly defined) preconditions strong enough to establish 
(explicitly defined) postconditions; and data reification via 
(usually forward) simulation, where the use of (concrete) 
data structure representations in operations closer to an 
implementation language are shown to respect the abstract 
representation and operations. 
Our models have 49type definitions,61 Z schemas 
representing the NFC operations of the protocol,and 79 
proofs in total, of which 49 are theorems representing 
properties of interest for the whole model[20].  Feasibility 
proofs are useful in deducing formal model-based test cases 
as they characterise the complete space of behaviours for all 
operations of interest, including successful and all possible 
error cases, both determined by mathematical predicates 
representing disjoint behaviours of the protocol.  That is, 
feasibility proofs characterise a set of disjoint predicates with 
non-overlapping conditions that when accumulated lead to 
true (e.g.  precondition op = x < 0 or x > 0 or x = 0).  Thus, 
each disjunct represents a unique class of behaviours for the 
functionality being proved.  Moreover, we also prove that 
these disjunct predicates amount to true, hence we guarantee 
all behaviours are accounted for. 
The formal model follows the methodology advocated in 
[3], which enumerate requirements realised by each piece for 
formal specification.  Then, if all elements of the 
requirements are accounted for within the abstract model in 
away that conveys the indented behaviour described in 
English.  We state this formal model is a more accurate 
representation of the EMV protocol than the EMV 
specification books. 
These efforts correspond to theterminal side of Fig. 2The 
mechanisation of a formal concrete design, together with a 
proof of refinement these designs faithfully satisfy the 
abstract model linked to the requirements is under 
construction.  Refinement proofs are perhaps the most costly 
aspect of any proof exercise, as it needs to establish that the 
implementation details do not breach any of the contractual 
requirements established by the abstract model.   
We derive our test cases from this abstract model.  We 
also derive a systematic code-annotation technique, whereby 
the same principle of enumerating what aspect of the 
requirements each piece of code within the emulator is 
realised.  These test cases represent a test-oracle based on 
requirements testing, rather than testing for any 
implementation issues.  The former is likely to capture 
potential (major) errors, as well as inconsistencies within the 
protocol itself, as the next section discusses.  Errors from the 
concrete design are more likely to expose problems with 
implementation choices, and that is our aim in the future as 
well, where the emulator code will be annotated with formal 
specification amenable to static analysis of properties of the 
behaviour of the code. 
C. The Current Emulator Implementation 
The code of the emulator is structured according to the 
structure of the EMV specification, the core modules are (i) 
Kernel 0 contact Chip & PIN transactions for all card types 
(ii) Kernel 1 JCB contactless transactions (iii) Kernel 2 
MasterCard contactless transactions (iv) Kernel 3 Visa 
contactless transactions (v) Kernel 4 American Express 
contactless transactions (vi) Entry Point which initiates the 
transaction and decides which Kernel to run based on the 
type of card presented to the emulator (vii) the RSA 
cryptography module which is shared by all of the Kernels.  
So far we have implemented the Kernel 0, Kernel 2, Kernel 
3, Entry Point and Cryptography modules. 
V. TEST CASES 
Feasibility proofs were used to derive test cases for the 
emulator to satisfy.  In [20], a complete list of such cases is 
discussed.  Here, we present the key results from two main 
steps of the fDDA protocol: PDOL quests from the terminal 
to the card, and the card‘s SDAD response, both of which are 
responsible for establishing the requested transaction is valid 
and financially fulfilled. 
A. PDOL Test Cases 
For the PDOL, there are six tests of interest, five of 
which are error cases where we expect the emulator to 
demonstrate exceptional behaviour.  The successful case (s1) 
relies on: i) valid card capability (i.e.  user chose a Visa 
transaction on a Visa card); (ii) valid transaction with all the 
conditions for a fDDAcontactless transaction met (see [6] for 
details); and (iii) the right payload on the PDOL response.  
Error cases include: e1) when the capability is not available 
(i.eterminal choose MasterCard for a Visa card); e2) when 
the terminal‘s transaction usage cannot match any available 
usage from the card (i.e. card is cash-only); e3) when the 
card‘s and terminal‘s capabilities are incompatible (i.e. the 
fDDA is an offline transaction terminal and the terminal only 
supports online).  Finally, trivial error cases are when the 
transaction type is not NFC. 
For all these error cases the EMV requirements do not 
specify  what kind of PDOL should the protocol return.  That 
leaves the option of returning a valid PDOL (manufactured 
by mistake or design), which itself is something that needs 
tightening in the EMV documents.  We derived tests for 
these cases to see whether the emulator suffers from this 
(mis)behaviour.  Fortunately, this was not present in the 
code.  Nevertheless, this is indeed a hole in the EMV 
specification found through formal reasoning. 
B. Foreign Currency Transaction Limits 
The transaction currency is one of the important fields in 
the transaction data as it is one of the data elements signed 
by the card in the SDAD to verify the transaction to the 
terminal.  However the EMV specifications do not specify 
the process required when the terminal and the card have 
different currencies, the specifications contain a description 
of a reference currency which is to be used in this situation 
but no information about its use.  This omission in the EMV 
specification was discovered as part of the process to 
formulate the pro-conditions for the abstract model.  It was 
clear that the currency was one of the preconditions that 
should be included in the model but we could not establish 
correct process or outcome when the terminal currency != 
card currency from the EMV specification. 
The only specific reference to foreign currency 
transactions is in a MasterCard specific document 
OneSMART Pre-Authorized Solution Guide [8] which on 
page 2-10 states ―The card can only authorize transactions 
offline if they are expressed in the currency that the issuer 
specifies on the card application at personalization.  
Transactions in all other currencies will be driven online for 
authorization by the issuer.‖ 
VI. RESULTS OF THE TEST CASES 
A. Methodology and Environment 
The emulator allows us to configure the terminal settings 
so that we can create the specific conditions required to run 
the test cases generated by the abstract model.  The 
important terminal settingsfor the specific fDDA protocol 
sequence we discuss here are the Terminal floor limits and 
the Terminal Transaction Qualifiers (TTQ).  The Terminal 
floor limits specify the value above which transactions must 
be performed online.  The TTQ defines modes in which the 
terminal can operate (online / offline), the reader interfaces 
supported (EMV / magnetic strip), the cardholder 
verification modes supported (PIN / Signature / No 
Verification) and the card authentication cryptographic 
methods supported (SDA / DDA / CDA). 
For our tests the currency used is important. We used UK 
issued contactless bank cards in the test cases.  We know the 
card‘s contactless transaction limit is £15 (at time of testing) 
and the number of consecutive contactless transactions is 5 
(after which a PIN must be entered for authentication).  We 
know that the currency of the card is UK pounds.  Some of 
the card limits are unknown as the card does not divulge 
them (in particular the card‘s offline transaction limit and 
consecutive transaction limit). 
B. PDOL Test Cases 
At the start of a transaction the card issues the Processing 
options Data Object List (PDOL) which lists all of the data 
elements that the card requires the terminal to pass in the Get 
Processing Option command.  The PDOL request contains 
the data element tag and the expected length of the data 
element.  In test case (s1), for successful completion of the 
GPO command, the PDOL data returned by the terminal 
must (i) contain all of the data elements requested by the 
card (ii) all of the data elements must be of the correct length 
(iii) the data elements must be in the same order as requested 
in the list (iv) there must not be any additional data elements 
in the PDOL data. 
Test (e1) sends a standard MasterCard PDOL response to 
a Visa card.  MasterCard commonly uses an empty PDOL 
for Get Processing Options, which is represented by the 
command data field 83 followed by a length indicator of 00. 
Test case (e2) involves sending transaction data in the 
PDOL that conflicts with the available usage settings of the 
card.  This can be achieved by sending a cash back amount 
in the PDOL which conflicts with the usage of a contactless 
card. 
Test case (e3) requires that the terminal capabilities 
exclude the valid transaction being agreed given the cards 
capabilities.  The Terminal Transaction Qualifiers TTQ is 
included in the PDOL for Visa fDDA transactions to inform 
the card of the terminals capabilities.  The card should 
decline a transaction where the TTQ values exclude the 
circumstances required for anfDDA transaction.  Setting 
TTQ to include ―Online cryptogram required‖ and/or setting 
the TTQ to exclude ―EMV mode supported‖ will exclude the 
capabilities of the card which are required for an fDDA 
transaction.   
Test case (e4) involves the terminal sending PDOL data 
which does not conform to the PDOL list requested by the 
card.  The PDOL data can be corrupted in the following 
ways: (i) not including all of the data elements requested (ii) 
including data elements that are the incorrect length (iii) 
sending invalid data in the PDOL such as alpha characters 
where numeric data is expected (iv) including additional data 
elements in the PDOL data.  In all cases, the card should 
produce an error code in response to the GPO command 
containing the erroneous PDOL data. 
Results for Test Case (s1) - This is the success test case, 
as predicted by the abstract model the card approves the 
transaction and returns a valid SDAD. 
Applications Available on Card 
A0000000031010 <0> 
SELECT(A0000000031010)  
Contactless Transaction   
Date     = 011212 
Amount   = 5.00 
Cashback = 0.00 
Currency = 0826 
--------- Kernel 3 Processing --------------------- 
PDOL 
8321BA20C000000000000500000000000000082600000000000
8261212010061A0366B 
-- TC Returned by Get Processing Options (9F10) --- 
--------- Validating SDAD ------------------------- 
SDAD 
0F4970C0FEAD97A63445C28A866760B449F20D51BC49161CD0A
598482FDDE5D35557D1C0B4B759262DEB8132AB66744EF69A5B
D196BF6C105C7E47FC735D72B2D2ABD2035049B3DA1F1ACC6A4
33F51ED71CD42E94D391B6A1B06CD98D50F37035689D4ECA1AA
F244AFE729B3AE7CD704 
--------- TRANSACTION SUCCESSFUL ------------------ 
Results for Test Case (e1) - Sendinga valid MasterCard 
PDOL to a Visa card.  The card rejects the PDOL with the 
response 6A80 Invalid Data which is as per the abstract 
model. 
Applications Available on Card 
A0000000031010 <0> 
SELECT(A0000000031010)  
Contactless Transaction   
Date     = 000000 
Amount   = 0.00 
Cashback = 0.00 
Currency = 0000 
--------- Kernel 3 Processing --------------------- 
PDOL 
8300 
Error [6A80] returned by GetProcessingOptions() 
--------- TRANSACTION FAILED ---------------------- 
Results for Test Case (e2) - Transaction settings that 
conflict with the card usage settings, in this casethe 
cashbackvalue of the PDOLwas set to £5.00 which is not 
allowed for contactless transactions.  The card acts 
incorrectly it ignores the cashback and approves the 
transaction for £5.02 in the amount field.This demonstrates 
that the test cases generated by the abstract model have 
found an anomaly. 
Applications Available on Card 
A0000000031010 <0> 
SELECT(A0000000031010)  
Contactless Transaction   
Date     = 011212 
Amount   = 5.02 
Cashback = 5.00 
Currency = 0826 
--------- Kernel 3 Processing --------------------- 
PDOL 
8321BA20C000000000000502000000000500082600000000000
82612120100198E9611 
-- TC Returned by Get Processing Options (9F10) --- 
--------- Validating SDAD ------------------------- 
SDAD 
67E1584CE27464EE9FE72A56B8898E50BE5F5B1BF43EC08B9DE
CB069BE75B54165E39FD4C761B4DD6ADB1CADC571AA31E2B3ED
755F54F68E47F7BFFB15FF8B549EE2A98D26836191FB14D45EA
B2705B4DC3AEC3D69150404FF9A3B9BC8BCF81B7C54C13A4A1B
4393D9FCE63C9C7C7F14 
--------- TRANSACTION SUCCESSFUL ------------------ 
Results for Test Case (e3) – The terminal capabilities 
TTQ is set to exclude the offline capabilities of the card in an 
fDDA transaction. In this the card rejects the transaction 
when the terminal and card have incompatible capabilities 
with the error code 6984 Try Another Interface. This is as 
predicted by the abstract model. 
Applications Available on Card 
A0000000031010 <0> 
SELECT(A0000000031010)  
Contactless Transaction  
Date     = 011212 
Amount   = 5.00 
Cashback = 0.00 
Currency = 0826 
--------- Kernel 3 Processing --------------------- 
PDOL 
80A800002383218080000000000000050000000000082608260
00000000000001212010067D0F6ED 
Error [6984] returned by GetProcessingOptions() 
--------- TRANSACTION FAILED ---------------------- 
Results for Test Case (e4) 
We ran several test cases where the PDOL was not in the 
format requested by the card, in each case the card responded 
with the error code 6984 Try Another Interface. This is as 
predicted by the abstract model. 
C. Foreign Currency Transaction Limits 
The cards used in our testing were UK issued credit and 
debit cards operating in GB pounds, none of which were 
MasterCard.We set up transactions in Australian Dollars 
with values of $50.00 (£32.39), $101.00 (£65.43),$200.00 
(£129.56), $300.00 (£194.34).  All of the transactions were 
approved even thoughvaluewas greater than the £15.00 
contactless transaction limit.  The following log entry shows 
aAUD$300.00 transaction being approved by a contactless 
Visa card, approval is signified by the card returning a valid 
SDAD and Application Cryptogram for each transaction. 
Applications Available on Card 
A0000000031010 <0> 
SELECT(A0000000031010)  
Contactless Transaction  
Date     = 120328 
Amount   = 300.00 
Cashback = 0.00 
Currency = 0036 
--------- Kernel 3 Processing --------------------- 
PDOL = 8321BE20C0000000000300000000000000000036000 
000000000361203280020CF96C4 
-- TC Returned by Get Processing Options (9F10) --- 
--------- Validating SDAD ------------------------- 
9F4B =>7E1795D15F95EB7CB97F2550894B3871AB1DA56BA194 
CD9217ACE931FC895FC8EA6B4A13732EA04CE6E96760785DE0F
67BDCDC1B243825206C91B178ED56474361A4E08EE555873998
AE2A3FA4DF260ABDFFB6B40E07D19898829AA2BE8B88118E9FA
2261D71E8B7F1C847E61F4490E5C2DE66D0CB3C0E64AE680D13
076DB871 
--------- TRANSACTION SUCCESSFUL ------------------ 
This foreign currency example demonstrates that by 
creating the abstract model, we found an anomaly.  This 
allowed us to generate a test case, to see how the emulator 
implementations handled this situation and in this case the 
emulator indeed handled foreign currencies as predicted by 
the formal model.   
VII. EVALUATION 
Evaluation of the research reported in this paper pertains 
to two facets: correctness of the emulator itself, and an 
assessment of the benefits and limitations of the process we 
used in the design of the emulator.  By the nature of this line 
of work, the evaluation is largely qualitative, based on the 
experiences of the researchers, although of course some 
objective results for the tests exist.   
With respect to correctness of the emulator, the formally 
derived test casesreveal that the emulator code correctly 
handles the test suite.  The formally derived test both show 
correctness with respect to the EMV standard as well as to 
observed anomalies in this specification.  Additionally, we 
used the emulator throughout our research intopotential 
security vulnerabilities of the EMV protocols, and revisedthe 
code as needed for this use.  Further confidence in the code 
can gained throughdeveloping with more extensive test 
suites, but this has been outside the scope of the current 
work. 
Additional confidence in the quality of the code comes 
from the use of the design process we depicted in Fig. 1The 
systemic documentation of the code allows us to maintain a 
clear overview of the link between UML diagrams, the 
emulator code and EMV documents.  This is especially 
important since transactions captured in a single UML 
sequence diagrams often span multiple EMV documents.  
Hence, code documentation assures that the link between 
code, UML and EMV remains firmly established.   
Another important element in the design process is the 
creation of a formal abstract model that represents the EMV 
protocol, in our specific case the fDDA transaction.  
Construction of the formal model facilitated the 
identification of anomalies in the EMV specification (e.g., 
about limits in foreign currency) as well as the generation of 
test cases for fDDA.  This demonstrates the importance of 
the feedback the emulator implementation received from the 
process of constructing an abstract model.   
At the centre of our methodology is capturing the EMV 
transactions as UML sequence diagrams.  As indicated in 
Fig. 2correctness (albeit informal) of the sequence diagrams 
is the key to correctness of the code.  Three efforts feed into 
identifying the sequence diagrams, in an iterative process: (i) 
the EMV documents themselves; (ii) the insights obtained 
when constructing the formal model, and (iii) the insights 
obtained when coding the emulator.  We believe that the 
combination of the three provide a scalable approach to 
developing an accurate and reliable emulation of the EMV 
protocol.   
VIII. RELATED WORK 
The related work for the current paper can be naturally 
subdivided in work that relates to payment protocols such as 
EMV and work that relates to the design process of 
emulators and related software, including that based on the 
use of formal methods.   
EMV is documented in the various EMV specification 
[1][2]documents, to which we have made reference 
throughout the paper.  In addition, there is a body of research 
in the security of EMV protocol, including the search for 
vulnerabilities such as in [8][9].  However, for the current 
paper, the most relevant literature related to EMV and 
similar payment protocols is that on research that establishes 
simulators or emulators for EMV. 
Several authors have used emulators as a tool to test 
applications early in the life cycle and to try out attacks, but 
none of the authors went to much length to argue the quality 
of the resulting emulators.  It seems that this comes from the 
fact that the development of the emulator has a more specific 
purpose, and therefore a generic ‗soundness‘ of the software 
is less sought for.  As an example, Mohorko et al [10] 
present an emulator for a payment system called Margento, 
but do not discuss the underlying design method.  This is 
understandable, since the purpose of the work was to 
demonstrate the practicability of the voice-based 
authentication system of Margento.   
Our approach is inspired by elements of the Praxis 
approach to high-integrity development [3][17], but does not 
go to, for instance, the length of formal proofs.  See Section 
III for a detailed scoping discussion.  The prime use of 
formal methods is in generating test cases.  However, as 
important is the deep and precise understanding we gained 
from constructing the formal model—this was an important 
source of feedback that we believe strongly improved the 
quality of our code.  Obviously, elements of the Praxis 
approach have seen extensive use in industry, and also for 
EMV code there is a case for increased rigour in hardware 
and software development of systems and applications.  This 
paper is a first step in that direction.   
Closest related to our work is the SmartLogic tool set by 
De KoningGans and De Ruiter[14].  It implements a suite of 
hardware and software tools for the particular objective of 
executing attack scenarios.  The solution results in a publicly 
available set of tools, including emulator software for some 
aspects of the protocol.  There is no description of a 
(rigorous) design such as in this paper, and arguably, this is 
the consequence of SmartLogic‘s aim to demonstrate it is a 
useful tool to analyze attack scenarios.  Nevertheless, also in 
these cases, the design methods followed in this paper may 
be appropriate to help improve the quality of the emulator 
code.   
Pushing the envelope with respect to the use of emulators 
is the work by Balfe and Paterson [12].  It provides a highly 
sophisticated use of an emulator as part of a payment system 
to assure that security properties of EMV extend to online 
payments.  The emulator is embedded in a Trusted Platform 
Module.  Again, the methods used for designing and 
implementing the emulator are secondary; the main trust of 
the paper is the design of a system to provide point of sale 
terminal equivalent security properties for online transactions 
(in which the card is not physically read). 
For completeness, we discuss a quite different type of use 
of emulator or simulator code, such as by Bokai and 
Mahammadi[16].  Whereas an emulator substitutes for or 
replaces the physical incarnation of a protocol, simulation is 
a purely logic version of the protocol.  The focus in 
simulation is not on direct equivalence with the protocols but 
on finding the right level of abstraction at which to analyze 
the protocol.  [16]does this for a micro payment scheme.  
Our emulator could potentially be used for usability studies 
or for visualization, but that is not its primary purpose.  
Therefore, the focus in the current paper is on directly 
mimicking the EMV protocol, without a desire to abstract 
away any details.   
Related to the current paper in yet other ways are papers 
that are concerned with generating test cases.  Devos et al 
[13] use software patterns for the identification of reusable 
test cases.  Arguing that formal approaches are too 
expensive, reuse of test cases across application with 
similarities is being explored.  Although the researchers 
constructed four versions of an implementation (from 'toy' to 
one with 20 commands), the focus of the paper was not on 
the methods behind the implementation of the emulator.  
Certainly, identifying patterns, for instance derived from 
generalization of our UML descriptions, would be an 
interesting avenue to pursue to identify test cases with good 
coverage.  However, this was not within the scope of the 
current work.   
Finally, we like to point the reader to related work in the 
formal verification of security properties of payment 
protocols such as EMV.  This has a rich history, as becomes 
clear from the paper by Stepney et al on Mondex in 1996[4].  
More recent, the EMV protocol has been subject to formal 
approaches.  In the current paper, we used a formal abstract 
model that is detailed in a technical report [20] and can be 
expected to be published separately in future work.  Related 
formal treatment of the EMV protocol can be found in [14], 
giving a formal analysis using F# and the ProVerif and 
FS2PV tools.  Similarly, Pasupathinathan and colleagues 
[15]studied online authorization approaches such as Verified 
by VISA using Casper and FDR2 tools.  We believe that the 
publications are only the start of a significant amount of 
additional formal treatment of protocols work that should be 
pursued for EMV and related protocols.   
To summarize, the work in this paper is the first emulator 
for the EMV protocol that seriously considered high-
integrity software development methods.  Other emulators 
exist, but these serve a specific purpose (e.g., analyzing 
attack scenarios or particular protocol extensions) and 
possibly because of that are less concerned with the methods 
underlying the software development.   
IX. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we presented the design and implementation 
of an EMV emulator.  The purpose of the emulator is to aid 
in the development of applications and new cards through 
rapid testing and to aid in the research of dependability 
(including security) related anomalies and properties.  
Therefore, we went through great length to follow a rigorous 
but practicable design and implementation process in the 
development of the emulator software.  At the centre of the 
process is the identification of a set of UML sequence 
diagrams that as precisely as possible (within the limitations 
of UML) captures the EMV transactions.  Three important 
sources work together to assist in constructing correct 
sequence diagrams: the EMV specifications, the insights 
gained from constructing a formal model and the insights 
gained from coding the emulator.  The formal model also 
allowed for identification of anomalies in the EMV protocol 
and generation of relevant test cases and we showed that our 
code passed the test suite. The result of the work is an EMV 
point of sale terminal emulator that represents a highly 
accurate implementation of EMV protocols, with 
functionality as well as quality characteristics that is 
currently not present in any other EMV software.   
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